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a b s t r a c t
Android security has been a hot spot recently in both academic research and public
concerns due to numerous instances of security attacks and privacy leakage on Android
platform. Android security has been built upon a permission based mechanism which
restricts accesses of third-party Android applications to critical resources on an Android
device. Such permission based mechanism is widely criticized for its coarse-grained
control of application permissions and difficult management of permissions by de-
velopers, marketers, and end-users. In this paper, we investigate the arising issues in
Android security, including coarse granularity of permissions, incompetent permission
administration, insufficient permission documentation, over-claim of permissions,
permission escalation attack, and TOCTOU (Time of Check to Time of Use) attack. We
illustrate the relationships among these issues, and investigate the existing countermea-
sures to address these issues. In particular, we provide a systematic review on the
development of these countermeasures, and compare them according to their technical
features. Finally, we propose several methods to further mitigate the risk in Android
security.
ª 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Android security has been under a spotlight in information
security as Android smartphones become the most popular
mobile devices in the current market. Since the first Android-
powered phone was delivered in October 2008 (Gozalvez,
2008), Android smartphones have grown to the largest global
market share (75%) among all smartphones shipped in the
first quarter of 2013 (IDC, 2013). In May 2013, Google
announced that 900 million Android devices had been acti-
vated (Welch, 2013). According to F-Secure, a cyber security-
related company, the number of new mobile threat families
and variants continued to rise by 49% from the previous
quarter; 91.3% of these threats targeted at Android devices in
the first quarter of 2013 (F-Secure, 2013).
Android smartphones are protected by a permission
based framework which restricts third-party applications’
accesses to sensitive resources such as SMS database and
external storage in Android smartphones. The accesses to
sensitive resources may lead to money loss. For example,
Android malware may send premium rate messages, make
premium rate calls, and generate large amount of network
data without users’ acknowledgment. Moreover, the
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Permission based Android security: Issues and countermeasures
accesses to sensitive resources may lead to leakage of users’
private information stored in smartphones such as contacts,
emails, and even credit card numbers. Third-party applica-
tion developers can leverage various smartphone sensors
such as GPS, cameras, and microphones, then create ap-
plications that do more than what they claimed so as to
collect users’ private information stealthily (Fragkaki et al.,
2012). In the current Android permission framework, ac-
cesses to critical resources on smartphones are controlled
according to permissions given to applications at install-
time. That is, each application must request for certain
permissions for it to access system resources on a smart-
phone at install-time and the user of the smartphone
should make a decision on whether or not to grant the
permissions requested.1
Such permission based framework is criticized as coarse-
grained. Many applications tend to request much more per-
missions than necessary. In most cases, a user has to either
grant all permissions an application requests or abort the
installation process, instead of granting the permissions one
by one. In addition, the permission based framework is
vulnerable due to insufficient control of cooperation among
applications and poor documentation on how to use various
permissions.
Android security has attracted much attention from both
academia and industry. To the best of our knowledge, pa-
pers related to Android security appeared as early as 2008
(Enck et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2008), which is the same
year when the first Android-powered smartphone was
delivered. Along with the explosive growth of Android-
powered devices in the following years, a considerable
number of research papers on Android security have been
published.
Given the large number of published researches on
Android security, especially on Android permission frame-
work, we provide a systematic overview of the current state of
Android security. In particular, we investigate the recent
advancement on Android security, identify the issues in
Android permission framework, and analyze the counter-
measures to address the security issues.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
introduces the background of Android security. Section 3
classifies the issues in Android permission framework. Sec-
tion 4 investigates existing solutions to address Android se-
curity issues. Section 5 discusses the future work. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper.
Background of Android security
Android is proposed as a software stack for mobile devices.
It consists of an operating system, an application frame-
work, and core applications. Each Android application exe-
cutes in a separate Dalvik virtual machine instance running
as a unique user identity assigned at install-time. Thus
applications are essentially isolated. This design provides
promising security for file accesses and limits potential
damage due to programming flaws such as buffer overflow
(Enck et al., 2011).
Android restricts accesses to critical resources using per-
missions. A permission is simply a unique text string which
can be defined by Android or third party developers. Accord-
ing to the documentation for Android developers, there are
currently 130 permissions (Android, 2013b), which are defined
in Android operating system, ranging from access to camera
(CAMERA), full access to the Internet (INTERNET), dialing a
phone number (CALL_PHONE), and even disabling the phone
function permanently (BRICK). According to the study of Wei
et al. (2012), the number of Android defined permissions
keeps increasing since the first widely-used release (API level
3). The expansion of the permission set aims at not only
providing finer-grained permissions but also controlling ac-
cesses to new hardware features (Wei et al., 2012). In addition
to Android defined permissions, application developers can
also declare customized permissions so as to protect their
own critical resources.
Permissions may be required when an application is
interacting with system resources, including calling system
API functions, and reading from and writing to file systems.
Granted permissions are assigned to an application’s sandbox
and inherited by all of the application’s components, while
required permissions are assigned to application components
(Bugiel et al., 2011a). In the manifest file of an application,
which is included in the application package, the application
declares the permissions which it requires to achieve its
functionality, as well as defines the permissions for protecting
its own components and resources. A permission can be
associated with one of the following four protection levels
(Android, 2013a):
 Normal: A low-risk permissionwhich allows applications to
access API calls (e.g., SET_WALLPAPER) causing no harm to
users.
 Dangerous: A high-risk permission which allows applica-
tions to access potential harmful API calls (e.g., READ_-
CONTACTS) such as leaking private user data or control over
smartphone device.
 Signature: A permission which is granted if its requesting
application is signed with the same certificate as the
application which defines the permission is signed.
 Signature-or-system: A permission which is granted only if
its requesting application is in the same Android system
image or is signed with the same certificate as the appli-
cation which defines the permission is signed.
At install-time, a user is shown with a list of permis-
sions which an application requests. The user must either
grant or deny all of these permissions together. After the
user approves the permission request and installs the
application, the application owns its permissions
throughout its lifetime and it does not need to request
them again at run-time. Android controls Inter-Component
Communication (ICC) through a reference monitor. The
reference monitor provides a Mandatory Access Control
(MAC) enforcement on how applications access compo-
nents by evaluating whether the applications are granted
with necessary permissions.
1 In the recent version of Android 4.3, users can revoke an ap-
plication’s permissions after the application is installed.
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Analysis of Android security issues
Overview
We summarize the issues of Android security and illustrate
their relationships in Fig. 1. We divide the issues into two
categories: direct issues and indirect issues. Direct issues may
lead to financial losses or leakage of user private information
directly. On the other hand, the indirect issues can be used as
stepping stones in launching attacks to Android smartphones.
As shown in Fig. 1, direct issues include over-claim of
permissions, permission escalation attack and TOCTOU (Time
of Check to Time of Use) attack, while the rest, including
coarse granularity of permissions, incompetent permission
administrators, and insufficient permission documentation,
are indirect issues. The coarse granularity of permissionsmay
lead to over-claim of permissions and make it more difficult
for users to detect over-claim of permissions. Note that, the
TOCTOU attack exists in Android due to naming collusion
(Shin et al., 2010). In particular, even if a user un-installs a
third party application after approving its defined permis-
sions, the authorization given to the permissions is not
revoked. After this, if a malicious application requires a
permissionwhich has the samename as one of the authorized
permissions, then the malicious application can directly ex-
ercise such permission without approval.
Consider the issue of coarse-grained INTERNET permis-
sions. One example is that a malicious developer may claim
that the INTERNET permission is only used to display adver-
tisements in a standalone game. While a user is tricked into
trusting the legitimacy of the INTERNET request, themalicious
developer can leverage the coarse-grained feature of
INTERNET permission and access tolled websites secretly.
Incompetent permission administrators and insufficient
permission documentation may result in accidental over-
claim of permissions. Unconsciously over-claimed permis-
sions assigned to a benign application can be exploited by a
malicious application. For example, a malicious application
can perform the confused deputy attack to exploit the permis-
sions of a benign application (Dietz et al., 2011). More detail
about the confused deputy attack is given in Section 3.6.
Fig. 1 shows that indirect issues lead to direct issues via
either implicit relation or explicit relation. For a malicious
developer to leverage the vulnerability of incompetent
permission administrators, he or she must perform an
attack exploiting the vulnerability left by an incompetent
permission administrator in an application. For example, an
incompetent administrator may carelessly approve the
installation of an application having access to critical re-
sources. Given this vulnerability, the permission escalation
attack can be launched by malicious applications. In addi-
tion, for a malicious developer to launch a TOCTOU attack
against a user, the attacker must trick the user into
installing a malicious application first. On the other hand,
coarse granularity of permissions, incompetent permission
administrators and insufficient permission documentation
may lead to over-claim of permissions without any inter-
mediate process.
Coarse granularity of permissions
Although Android defines 130 permissions, most of them
are of coarse granularity. Especially, the INTERNET permis-
sion (Barrera et al., 2010), the READ_PHONE_STATE permis-
sion (Pearce et al., 2012), and the WRITE_SETTINGS
permission (Jeon et al., 2012) are coarse-grained as they give
an application arbitrary accesses to certain resources. Tak-
ing the INTERNET permission as an example, the INTERNET
permission allows an application to send HTTP(S) requests
to all domains, and connect to arbitrary destinations and
ports (Felt et al., 2011c). As a result, the INTERNET permis-
sion provides insufficient expressiveness to enforce control
over the Internet accesses of the application (Barrera et al.,
2010). According to Barrera et al.’s study in 2010, 62.36% of
application samples downloaded from Google Play Store use
this permission (Barrera et al., 2010). However, Felt et al.
discovered that about 36% of the applications they reviewed
use the INTERNET permission for making HTTP(S) requests
to specific domains only. These Android applications rely on
remote servers for getting content, much like web applica-
tions. Moreover, about 7% applications use the INTERNET
permission to support Google AdSense which displays ad-
vertisements from a single domain in a WebView (Felt et al.,
2011c). This indicates that many applications would tolerate
a restrictive INTERNET permission which allows applica-
tions to access nothing in Internet but a specific list of
domains.
While the INTERNET permission is necessary for many
applications such as networked games, the usage of this
permission cannot be restricted or controlled by users. As a
result, a malicious application may camouflage itself as a
legitimate application which indeed requires Internet ac-
cesses, while misusing its Internet accesses without users’
acknowledgment.
Fig. 1 e Relationship among issues in Android permission mechanism.
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Incompetent permission administrators
Several roles, including developers and end-users, are
involved in the process of granting application permissions.
Developers write manifest files to request permissions for
applications, while end-users approve the requests. After
approval, applications may run with the granted permissions.
In addition, application marketers may verify applications.
They may abort the process of permission authorization if
applications are put off from markets.
Unfortunately, both developers and end-users usually lack
professional knowledge. In addition, the developers and end-
users may have conflict of interest (Han et al., 2013). When a
developer writes amanifest file requesting permissions for his
or her application, the developer may not know in detail what
is at risk for end-users if the application is granted with these
permissions. While some enthusiastic developers might take
time to learn what each of the 130 permissions does and
request them appropriately, other developers might choose to
simply over-claim permissions so as to make sure their ap-
plications work any way (Barrera et al., 2010).
As for end-users, the survey performed by Felt et al. (Felt
et al., 2012) shows that only 3% of Internet survey re-
spondents correctly answered all three permission compre-
hension questions and 24% of laboratory study participants
demonstrated competent but imperfect comprehension.
Insufficient permission documentation
Google Inc. provides a great deal of documentation for
Android application developers, but the content on how to use
permissions on Android platform is limited (Vidas et al., 2011).
As investigated by Felt et al., the lack of permission usage
information may lead to developers’ errors. In Android 2.2
documentation, permission requirements are provided for 78
methods; however, Felt et al.’s test reveals permission re-
quirements for 1259 methods, which is a sixteen-fold
improvement over the documentation. The documentation
lists additional permissions in several class descriptions, but it
is not clear which methods of the classes require the stated
permissions. Moreover, six errors are identified in Android
permission’s documentation. The insufficient and imprecise
permission information confuses Android application de-
velopers, who may write applications with guesses, assump-
tions and repeated tries. Consequently, this leads to defective
applications which become threats with respect to security
and privacy of Android users (Felt et al., 2011b).
Furthermore, the content of permissions is usually too
technical for end-users to understand. Taking INTERNET
permission as an example, when an end-user reads the
permission description FULL INTERNET ACCESS: Allows an
application to create network sockets (Android, 2011), he or she
often feels that this description is too complex and abstruse.
The usermight not knowwhat risk he or she would face when
approving the permission request.
Over-claim of permissions
Over-claim of permissions is probably the most severe threat
to Android security. It directly breaks the principle of least
privilege (PLP) (Saltzer, 1974). This violation of PLP exposes
users to potential privacy leakage and financial losses. For
example, if a standalone game application requests for the
SEND_SMS permission which is unnecessary, the permission
can be exploited to send premium rate messages without
users’ acknowledgment.
Felt et al. identified that 56% of the over-privileged appli-
cations have only one extra unnecessary permission and 94%
have 4 or fewer extra permissions. The low degree of over-
claim of permissions per-application indicates that de-
velopers attempt to add correct permissions rather than
arbitrarily request for a larger number of unnecessary per-
missions. Developers may make wrong decisions because of
several reasons, concluded by Felt et al. (Felt et al., 2011b),
including: at first, developers tend to request for permissions
with names that look relevant to the functionalities they
design, even if the permissions are not actually required;
second, developersmay request for permissionswhich should
be requested by deputy applications instead of their own ap-
plications; finally, developers may make mistakes due to
using copy and paste, deprecated permissions, and testing
artifacts.
As shown in Fig. 1, the issue of over-claim of permissions
can be categorized into: malicious and unconscious. Three
Fig. 2 e Categorization of the permission escalation attack.
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other issues, including coarse granularity of permissions,
incompetent permission administrators, and insufficient
permission documentation, are drivers of over-claim of
permissions.
Permission escalation attack
In contrary to the general belief that the damage imposed by
an Android malware is limited to an application’s sandbox,
the permission escalation attack allow amalicious application
to collaborate with other applications so as to access critical
resources without requesting for corresponding permissions
explicitly (Bugiel et al., 2011a; Felt et al., 2011a; Marforio et al.,
2012).
Fig. 2 shows the categorization of the permission escala-
tion attack. The permission escalation attack can be classified
into two categories: confused deputy attack and collusion attack.
The confused deputy attack exploits the vulnerabilities in
unprotected interfaces of privileged benign applications (Dietz
et al., 2011). As shown in Fig. 3, the application A1 is not
granted with the permission P1; C1, which is a component of
A1, cannot directly access system resource R1 protected by
permission P1. However, C1, can access R1 transitively if
application A2 is granted with permission P1 and one of A2 ’s
component, C2 does not require any permission to be
accessed. As a result, C1 can access R1 through C2 and C2
(Bugiel et al., 2011a).
In addition, the collusion attack can be carried out by mul-
tiple applications in generating a joint set of permissions
which enables them to perform an unauthorized or malicious
actions (Schlegel et al., 2011). The collusion attack can be further
classified by the way applications communicate with each
other, into direct collusion attack, where applications commu-
nicate directly, and indirect collusion attack where applications
communicate via a third application or component in be-
tween (Bugiel et al., 2011a).
The indirect collusion attack usually involves another appli-
cation or component as a mediation which can provide either
overt channels or covert channels (Marforio et al., 2012). Overt
channels, such as buffers, files and I/O devices, use a data ob-
ject as the entity to hold certain information. In other words,
the entity is an object that is normally viewed as a data
container (Kemmerer, 2002). Other examples of overt channels
include shared preferences, system logs, and UNIX socket
communication (Marforio et al., 2012).
In contrast, covert channels use entities which are normally
not intended to be used for communication (Kemmerer, 2002;
Marforio et al., 2011). It is possible to use covert channels to
bypass the Android’s middleware layer (Bugiel et al., 2011a).
Examples of covert channels include file locks (Schlegel et al.,
2011), change of screen state, change of vibration settings
(Bugiel et al., 2011a), type of intents, threads enumeration
(Marforio et al., 2012), etc. Marforio et al. measured the
throughput of a number of overt and covert channels. The
measurement shows that even covert channels with low
throughput are still sufficient to exchange private information
(Marforio et al., 2012).
TOCTOU attack
The vulnerability of TOCTOU (Time of Check to Time of Use)
exists in Android mainly due to naming collusion. No naming
rule or constraint is applied to a new permission declaration
(Shin et al., 2010). Moreover, permissions in Android are rep-
resented as strings, and any two permissions with the same
name string are treated as equivalent even if they belong to
unrelated applications (Fragkaki et al., 2012). Malicious appli-
cation developers may exploit this flaw. Suppose a malicious
developer manages to trick a user into installing malicious
application A which declares permission P’, and another ma-
licious application B which requests permission P’. The name
of permission P’ is the same as permission P which protects
accesses to a critical resource. Afterward the user uninstalls
application A and installs benign application Cwhich declares
permission P. Now the malicious application B would be able
to use permission P0 to access the critical resource. According
to Shin et al., this TOCTOU flaw exists in Android 1.5, 1.6, 2.0
and 2.1, on both emulators and actual devices. In addition,
Fragkaki et al. claimed to have reproduced it in Android 2.3.7
(Fragkaki et al., 2012). Unfortunately, this vulnerability cannot
be thwarted using protection levels in the current Android
permission system.
Enhanced designs and implementations
Countermeasures to over-claim of permissions
Overview
Generally, the effort of coping with the issue of over-claim of
permissions is two-fold: (i) detection and analysis of over-
Fig. 3 e Permission escalation attack (Bugiel et al., 2011a).
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claim of permissions in Android applications (Felt et al., 2011c,
2011b; Wei et al., 2012), and (ii) proposals of enhanced
frameworks which allow users to revoke over-claimed per-
missions at install time or run-time (Nauman et al., 2010;
Beresford et al., 2011; Hornyack et al., 2011). Since adver-
tising is a key revenue for free Android applications, the
advertising libraries contained in Android applications usu-
ally require INTERNET, ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, and READ_-
PHONE_STATE permissions (Pearce et al., 2012). Therefore,
there also exists a category of countermeasures specific to the
over-claim of permissions introduced by the advertising li-
braries contained in Android applications (Pearce et al., 2012;
Shekhar et al., 2012; Leontiadis et al., 2012).
Finer-grained permission models introduced in Section 4.2
is an indirect countermeasure to combat the issue of over-
claim of permissions.
Countermeasures
Detection of over-claim of permissions. As for detecting over-
claim of permissions in Android applications, Felt et al.
manually reviewed the top free and top paid applications from
18 Google Play categories in 2011 (Felt et al., 2011c). For each of
the applications, Felt et al. compared its functionalities with
the permissions it requested by exercising its user interface.
Four out of 36 applications were over-privileged, while the
INTERNET permission accounted for three of the over-
privileged applications.
Felt et al. built Stowaway, an automatic tool to detect over-
claim of permissions in compiled applications (Felt et al.,
2011b). Stowaway analyzed a set of 940 applications and
identified that about one-third of these applications have
unnecessary permissions. The most common unnecessary
permissions include ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, READ_-
PHONE_STATE, ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, WRITE_-
EXTERNAL_STORAGE, and CALL_PHONE. Such unnecessary
permissions can be leveraged by malicious applications.
In 2012, Wei et al. applied Stowaway to a set of 237 evolving
third party applications covering 1703 versions. The result
showed that the overall tendency was towards over-claim of
permission (Wei et al., 2012). In particular, 19.6% of updated
versions of applications were over-privileged due to added
permissions, and 25.2% of applications were initially over-
privileged and stayed over-privileged during their evolu-
tions. On the other hand, 11.6% of applications resorted from
over-privileged to legitimate.
Au et al. built PScout, a static analysis tool which captures
permission requirements for every API call by examining the
entire Android source code (Au et al., 2012). After comparing
the permission lists produced by PScoutwith those specified in
the manifest files, Au et al. discovered that 543 out of 1260
applications required at least one over-claimed permission.
Enhanced system implementations. In 2010, Nauman et al.
proposed Android Permission Extension (Apex) (Nauman et al.,
2010), a policy enforcement framework which allows users
to selectively grant permissions to an application using a
simple and easy-to-use interface provided by Poly, an
augmented application installer. When a user installs a new
application, he or she may grant or deny permissions one by
one. With Apex, even after an application has been installed, a
user is able to grant more permissions or revoke some of the
granted permissions.
In 2011, MockDroid, proposed by Beresford et al., allows
users to revoke access permissions to particular resources at
run-time (Beresford et al., 2011). For the revoked permissions,
fake or “mock” data are provided to applications which call
the corresponding functions. For example, a user might
choose to provide a fake constant value when an application
tries to retrieve the device ID. Other categories of data which
could be “mocked” include location, Internet, SMS/MMS, cal-
endar, contact and broadcast intents.
Hornyack et al. (2011) proposed AppFence, which covertly
substitutes shadow data to replace private data. Similar to
MockDroid, when an application attempts to access critical
resources such as device ID and location, AppFence provides
fake data instead. In addition, AppFence blocks network
transmission of the data which the user makes available to
the application for on-device use only by extending the
TaintDroid information-flow tracking system.
Zhou et al. developed TISSAwhich defines a private mode for
Android based smart phones (Zhou et al., 2011). The private
mode enables users to flexibly control what kinds of personal
information, e.g., device ID, contracts, call log, and location,
are accessible to an application. Moreover, the granted per-
missions can be dynamically adjusted at run-time so as to
better meet user’s requirements. For each kind of personal
information, TISSA supports four options: empty, anonymized,
bogus, and trusted to protect the information. The empty option
simply returns an empty result to a requesting application,
indicating “non-presence” of the requested information. The
anonymized option provides an anonymized version from orig-
inal personal information, which still allows applications to
proceed without necessarily leaking user’s information. The
bogus option provides a fake result for requested information.
Finally, the trusted option returns the original personal infor-
mation as requested.
Similar to Apex, in 2012, Mueller et al. proposed Flex-P,
which revises the Android permission system for managing
application permissions at run-time (Mueller and Butler,
2011). Flex-P allows end-users to grant a subset of permis-
sions at install-time and change the granted permissions at
any time even after installation.
Separating advertising libraries. AdDroid by Pearce et al. (2012),
AdSplit by Shekhar et al. (2012), and the work by Leontiadis
et al. (2012) are countermeasures to thwart the over-claim of
permissions introduced due to using advertising libraries
contained in Android applications. Since they work similarly,
AdDroid will be used as an example in the following analysis.
In 2012, Pearce et al. conducted a study of Google Play Store
and discovered that 49% of Android applications contained at
least one advertising library and that application developers
over-claimed about 46% of advertising-supported applications
(23% of all applications) by one ormore permissions due to the
use of advertising libraries. Further, 56% of applications with
advertisements requested for location information (34% of all
applications) solely due to the requirement of advertisements
(Pearce et al., 2012). To address this issue,AdDroid introduces a
new advertising API as well as certain advertising permissions
for Android platform so that privileged advertising
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functionalities can be separated from host applications,
allowing applications to show advertisements without
requesting for privacy-sensitive permissions.
Comparison
Table 1 summarizes the comparison among countermeasures
to over-claim of permissions.
While Felt et al. built Stowaway tool to detect the over-
claim of permissions in Android applications and provided
a quantitative analysis for over-claim of permissions, Wei
et al.’s work was based on the same tool but focused on the
tendency of over-claim of permissions in the evolution of
Android platform and third party applications. In contrast to
Stowaway which fuzzes Android APIs directly, PScout fuzzes
the applications which use the APIs (Au et al., 2012). As a
result, PScout is more complete but less sound than Stow-
away. However, Stowaway and PScout are both incomplete
because they cannot catch those APIs invoked through Java
reflection. In addition, PScout works on any version of
Android while Stowaway’s specification is for Android 2.2
(Au et al., 2012).
When a permission to access a critical resource is revoked
by user,Apex throws an exception butMockDroid provides fake
data to requesting applications. As a result, applications are
more likely to crash underApex, compared toMockDroid. Flex-P
enables users to grant not only individual permissions but
also group permissions, which is an added functionality to
Apex. However, unlike Apex, Flex-P lacks the functionality of
adding new restriction types to granted permissions, such as
limiting a permission to a certain number of uses per day.
Compared toMockDroid, AppFence also protects the data which
users makes available to applications for on-device use only
from being misappropriated and sent off the device. While
Beresford et al. tested whether or not fake data can be pro-
vided to applications without causing them to crash, Hor-
nyack et al. measured user-discernable side effects as well
(Hornyack et al., 2011).
The difference amongMockDroid,AppFence, TISSA andApex,
Flex-P is that the latter two are restricted to the currently
available permissions. In contrast, the privacy setting of
MockDroid, AppFence, and TISSA is orthogonal to the currently
available Android permissions (Zhou et al., 2011).
Although AdDroid (Pearce et al., 2012), AdSplit (Shekhar
et al., 2012), and Leontiadis et al.’s work (Leontiadis et al.,
2012) share similar ideas in combatting the over-claim of
permissions through separating advertising libraries from
host applications, there are a few subtle differences among
them. AdSplit runs advertising libraries as separate applica-
tions, and allows applications to share the screen of phone.
Leontiadis et al.’s work leverages in-application widgets and
ICC instead of screen sharing in running advertising libraries
(Pearce et al., 2012).
Finer-grained permissions
Overview
Finer-grained permissions can be used to address the issues of
coarse-grained permissions. Finer-grained permission imple-
mentations can be categorized into install-time policy
enforcement and run-time policy enforcement. The install-
time policy enforcement aims to stop malicious applications
from being installed on user’s devices. It provides finer policy
enforcement at install-time rather than asking users to decide
whether to grant all permissions or nothing (Enck et al., 2008;
Ongtang et al., 2011). More factors, such as permission com-
binations, permission and action string combinations, and
signatures of requesting applications, are taken into consid-
eration. If an application violates one of the preset policies,
the installation of the application would be aborted. On the
other hand, the run-time policy enforcement allows users to
set finer-grained restrictions at run-time (Ongtang et al., 2011;
Nauman et al., 2010). The finer-grained restrictions can be
enforced on the permission configuration of an installed
application, such as how many times a critical resource is
allowed to be accessed, and what kinds of private information
can be accessed.
Finer-grained permissions can also be categorized ac-
cording to the type of improvement over coarse-grained per-
missions, including revising the current frameworks and
proposing new frameworks. The first category evaluates how
and where data are accessed or transferred complying with
finer-grained policies (Nauman et al., 2010). This category
usually involves the enhancement of the reference monitor
module in the Android middleware. The second category
provides new Android permission models instead of the
Table 1 e Comparison among the countermeasures to
over-claim of permissions.
Important feature Working
layer
Stowawaya Detect over-claim of permission N/Aj
Wei et al.
(2012)
Show tendency of over-claim
of permission
N/Aj
PScoutb Detect over-claim of permission N/Aj
Apexc Allow revoking of over-claimed
permissions
Middlewarek
MockDroidd Allow revoking of over-claimed
permissions
Middleware
AppFencee Allow revoking of over-claimed
permissions
Middleware
TISSAf Allow revoking of over-claimed
permissions
Middleware
Flex-Pg Allow revoking of over-claimed
permissions
Middleware
AdDroidh Separate advertising functionality Middleware
AdSpliti Separate advertising functionality Middleware
Leontiadis
et al. (2012)
Separate advertising functionality Middleware
a Felt et al. (2011c), and Felt et al. (2011b).
b Au et al. (2012).
c Nauman et al. (2010).
d Beresford et al. (2011).
e Hornyack et al. (2011).
f Zhou et al. (2011).
g Mueller and Butler (2011).
h Pearce et al. (2012).
i Shekhar et al. (2012).
j Stowaway, Wei et al. (2012), and PScout are static analysis tools
which do not run on Android OS.
k Countermeasures working in the middleware layer usually
consist of modifications in the application installer, the reference
monitor, the permission database, and the Dalvik virtual machine.
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current one (Jeon et al., 2012). A user can specify finer-grained
policies in new permission models.
Countermeasures
Install-time policy enforcement. In 2008, Enck et al. proposed
Kirin (Enck et al., 2008) and in 2009, Enck et al. enhanced Kirin
(Enck et al., 2009). Kirin performs policy enforcement at install-
time using a set of predefined security rules. These rules
decide whether the permission configuration and action
strings listed in an application package’s manifest file are
secure. Kirin not only evaluates an application on a single
permission basis, but also takes both permission combina-
tions and, permission and action string combinations into
consideration. For example, an eavesdropper on a voice call
requires a combination of READ_PHONE_STATE, RECORD_AUDIO
and INTERNET permissions to function appropriately. A voice
call eavesdropper can be prevented from being installed due
to enforcing the following security rule in Kirin “An application
must not have the PHONE_STATE, RECORD_AUDIO, and INTERNET
permission labels.”
Similar to Kirin, Ongtang et al. proposed Secure Application
INTeraction (Saint) in 2009 whose install-time policies regulate
the granting of application defined permissions (Ongtang
et al., 2011). In addition to Android’s protection level-based
permission granting policy, an application can define the
conditions under which the permissions defined by the
application can be granted to other applications at install-
time. An application might require a signature-based policy to
control how the permissions it declares are granted based on
the signature of a requesting application. An application
might also require a configuration-based policy to control the
permission assignments based on the configuration parame-
ters of a requesting application such as application versions.
At install time, Saint-enhanced installer retrieves the
requesting permissions from the manifest file in an applica-
tion package. For each permission, it queries an AppPolicy
provider, which maintains a database of all the policies. The
AppPolicy provider consults its policy database, and returns a
decision according to matching rules. If the matched policy
conditions pass, the installation proceeds. Otherwise, it is
aborted. Upon successful installation, the application’s po-
lices are appended in the AppPolicy provider’s policy database.
Run-time policy enforcement. In addition to install-time policy
enforcement, Saint by Ongtang et al. also enforces run-time
policies which regulate the communications between appli-
cations (Ongtang et al., 2011). With a configuration-based policy,
an application can define desirable configurations of oppo-
nent applications, such as the minimum version and a set of
permissions which an opponent application is allowed or
disallowed. Moreover, an application may wish to regulate its
interactions based on the transient state of phone. A phone
context-based policy is proposed to govern run-time in-
teractions based on context, such as location, time, Bluetooth
connection and connected devices, call state, data state, data
connection network, and battery level. At run-time, when a
caller application initiates ICC through Android middleware
framework, ICC is intercepted by Saint policy enforcement
code before any Android permission evaluation. Saint queries
AppPolicy provider for policies which match ICC. The AppPolicy
provider identifies the appropriate policies, evaluates the pol-
icy conditions (application state, phone configuration, and
etc.), and returns a decision. If the conditions are not satisfied,
ICC will be blocked; otherwise, ICC will be directed to existing
Android permission evaluation enforcement. Then, Android
allows or disallows ICC to continue based on traditional
Android policies.
In addition to allowing a user to selectively grant permis-
sions, Apex, which was first introduced in Section 4.1, allows a
user to impose quantitative run-time constraints on the usage
of resources, e.g., limiting the number of SMS sent each day
(Nauman et al., 2010). At install-time, for each permission,
besides the options to grant or deny permissions, Apex in-
troduces a third option, conditional allow. The user can
specify constraints on permissions, such as the number of
times a permission can be used, or the valid time per day
during which a permissions should be allowed. Moreover,
after install-time, the user might modify the constraints with
a shortcut in the settings application. These kinds of con-
straints are saved in an XML file, along with user’s policies of
selective permission administration described in Section 4.1.
Aurasium proposed by Xu et al. in 2012 (Xu et al., 2012) is an
application hardening service that bypasses the need to
modify Android system while enhancing Android’s security
and privacy controls. Aurasium enforces security and privacy
policies to an application by repackaging to attach sandboxing
codes to the application. For example, after downloading an
Android application from an unknown source, a user can put
the application into the Aurasium black box and obtain a
hardened version. Aurasium ensures that the interactions of
the harden application are closely monitored for malicious
activities, and policies protecting the user’s privacy and se-
curity are actively enforced. Aurasium intercepts almost all
types of interactions between the application and the oper-
ating system. For instance, when an application attempts to
access a remote site on the Internet, the IP of the remote
server is evaluated against an IP blacklist. When an applica-
tion attempts to send an SMS message, Aurasium evaluates
whether the number is a premium number. When an appli-
cation tries to access private information such as IMEI, IMSI,
stored SMSmessages, contact information, or services such as
camera, voice recorder, or GPS, a policy evaluation is per-
formed to allow or disallow the access. Aurasium also moni-
tors I/O operations such as write and read (Xu et al., 2012).
In 2012, Jeon et al. proposed an approach which consists of
three tools, RefineDroid, Mr. Hide, and Dr. Android (Jeon et al.,
2012). Jeon et al. created a taxonomy with four broad cate-
gories that groups standard Android permissions by the be-
haviors the permissions allowed. For each category, they
proposed new fine-grained variants. Joen et al. chose to focus
on the INTERNET permission, which is pervasive across ap-
plications and might be particularly dangerous. Joen et al.
developed a fine-grained, whitelisting permission Inter-
netURL(d), which allowed network connections only to
domain d and its subdomains. To validate the taxonomy,
RefineDroid, a static analysis tool that infers the fine-grained
permission usage in existing applications, was built. The
second tool, Mr. Hide is a set of Android services that wrap
several privileged Android APIs and dynamically enforce a
specified set of fine-grained permissions from the taxonomy.
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Finally, Dr. Android is a tool that removes Android permissions
in existing application package files without source code and
replaces the permissions with a specified set of fine-grained
versions that are accessed through Mr. Hide. A user can
employ Dr. Android to retrofit a downloaded application with
fine-grained permissions in order to enforce a desired security
policy by rewriting the application. During testing, almost all
activities of applications written by Dr. Android functioned
normally, with no observable changes. However, the perfor-
mance slowdown imposed by Mr. Hide was significant, since
the interprocess communication required by Mr. Hide was
quite an expensive operation.
Finer-grained context-related permission models. In 2011, CRePE
by Conti et al. allows users to set a context-related policy
enforcement, where the context here can be geological loca-
tion, time, and temperature (Conti et al., 2011). Suppose in a
business scenario, a company wants to restrict a set of ap-
plications that can run on smart phones provided by the
company to its employees during work activities. The context
during-work is defined as the locations of the company’s
buildings and the time of working hours. Policy information
only allows a restricted set of applications to run. The context
and policy information are stored in PolicyProvider, similar to
Saint’s AppPolicy provider. When in the context, PolicyManager
evaluates if an application which is about to run is in the
application set. If it is in the application set, the application
can run successfully. Otherwise the application is not allowed
to run.
Comparison
Table 2 summarizes the comparison among the finer-grained
permission implementations.
The enforcement of install-time policies, such as Kirin, is
restricted as it relies on application package metadata or the
manifest file. Therefore, dynamically created Broadcast Re-
ceivers, which are not specified in the manifest file, cannot be
put under control (Ongtang et al., 2011). Both Kirin and Saint
enforce install-time policies in a fine grain; a difference is that
only Saint allows install-time policies to be defined based on
signatures and versions. In Saint, any install-time policies are
defined by applications, while the source of Kirin policies is
mainly the authors of Kirin. On the other hand, the run-time
policies in Saint are defined by applications, while the source
of the Apex policies is mainly the end-users.
The run-time monitors which Aurasium inserted into an
application execute in the same process as the application,
and hence are potentially subject to circumvention (Jeon et al.,
2012). Dr. Android and Mr. Hide enhance Android security by
removing the original permissions from an application and
perform fine-grained permission evaluating in the Mr. Hide
service, which runs in a separate process. Saint, Apex, Aura-
sium, and CRePE all require themodification of Android system
or rooting devices. Dr. Android and Mr. Hide can run on un-
modified Android devices, but require the modification of
applications, which makes the process of installing a new
application much more complex (Jeon et al., 2012).
One difference between the countermeasures in Section
4.1 and the countermeasures in this section is that: the
countermeasures in Section 4.1 are made based on available
Android permissions or specific types of data, while the
countermeasures in this section provide fine-grained control
for users. In other words, the control discussed in this section
can be made based on permissions, signatures, action strings,
or even new permission frameworks.
Countermeasures to permission escalation attack
Overview
The countermeasures to the permission escalation attack
usually involve tracking and controlling the information flows
through ICC between applications (Enck et al., 2010; Dietz
et al., 2011; Jia et al., 2013). If the ICC violates one of the pre-
defined policies, the ICC is stopped or restricted. In addition,
Table 2 e Comparison among finer-grained permission implementations.
Important feature Enforcement phase Require system
modification
Working layer
Kirina Perform finer-grained install-time
policy enforcement
Install-time U Middleware
Saintb Perform finer-grained install-time and
run-time policy enforcement
Install-time
& Run-time
U Middleware
Apexc Allow run-time resource usage constraint Run-time U Middleware
Aurasiumd Perform finer-grained policy enforcement
by repackaging applications
Run-time 7 Applicationg
RefineDroid, Mr. Hide,
and Dr. Androide
Provide new permission system Run-time 7 Application
CRePef Allow finer-grained context-related
policy enforcement
Run-time U Middleware
a Enck et al. (2008), and Enck et al. (2009).
b Ongtang et al. (2011).
c Nauman et al. (2010).
d Xu et al. (2012).
e Jeon et al. (2012).
f Conti et al. (2011).
g Countermeasures working in the application layer usually involve modifying existing application packages and developing new applications
which run as normal Android applications.
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various permission escalation attacks are highlighted in
(Schlegel et al., 2011; Davi et al., 2011) to raise users’ concerns.
Countermeasures
Demonstration of permission escalation attack. In 2011, Schle-
gel et al. presented Soundcomber, a Trojan with few and
innocuous permissions that can extract targeted private in-
formation from the audio sensor of a phone (Schlegel et al.,
2011). Soundcomber is a typical example of malicious applica-
tions which can exploit covert channels in Android systems.
Davi et al. demonstrated how to send text messages to a
telephone number without explicitly requiring a permission
(Davi et al., 2011).
In 2012, Grace et al. developed a tool called Woodpecker
which identifies the vulnerabilities of the permission escala-
tion attack in eight popular Android smart phones (Grace
et al., 2012). They discovered that the stock Android system
did not properly enforce the permission model. Specifically,
several permissions that protect accesses to sensitive re-
sources were unsafely exposed to other applications, which
did not need to request these permissions for actual usages.
Defense mechanisms. Along with presenting Soundcomber,
Schlegel et al. proposed a defense mechanism (Schlegel et al.,
2011), whichmaintains a list of critical numbers and blocks all
applications from accessing the audio data during a sensitive
phone call.
In 2010, Enck et al. proposed TaintDroid, which tracks in-
formation flows by labeling (tainting) data from privacy-
sensitive sources and transitively applying labels as sensi-
tive data propagated through program variables, files, and
interprocess messages (Enck et al., 2010). If any tainted data
aim to leave the system at a taint sink (e.g., network interface),
a user is alerted about the application leaking the tainted data.
QUIRE, proposed by Dietz et al. in 2011, is a lightweight
provenance system (Dietz et al., 2011). QUIRE transparently
tracks and records the specific ICC call chain so that the
recipient can observe the full call chain associated with a
request. Moreover, QUIRE also extends to the network module
in the Linux kernel to analyze remote procedure calls. Since
the ICC recipient is aware of the initiator and even the entire
call chain, QUIRE can prevent ICC calls from untrusted agents
and fraudulent requests. To defend against the confused deputy
attack, QUIRE would deny an ICC request if the originating
application has not been granted with the corresponding
permission explicitly.
Similar to QUIRE, the IPC Inspection proposed by Felt et al.
tracks the information flows through ICC. When an applica-
tion receives a message from another application with less
privileges, IPC Inspectionmitigates the confused deputy attack by
reducing the permissions of the application to the intersection
between the recipient’s permissions and the requester’s per-
missions (Felt et al., 2011a). In addition to proposing IPC In-
spection, Felt et al. discovered several severe attacks against
Android’s system applications and demonstrated that many
pre-installed applications were vulnerable to the confused
deputy attack.
XManDroid (eXtended Monitoring on Android) by Bugiel et al.
tracks and analyzes the communication links among appli-
cations at run-time, and ensures that the application comply
to a desired policy (Bugiel et al., 2011a). XManDroid inspects
data transferred over ICC andmakes policy decisions based on
the content of intents. Moreover, XManDroid policies may
request user confirmation in order to allow or deny specified
ICC calls. XManDroid is invoked when the default Android
reference monitor grants an ICC call, and verifies whether the
requested ICC call complies to predefined security policies,
e.g., “An application that is notified about incoming or out-
going calls and can record audio must not communicate to an
application with network access”. To mitigate the collusion
attack over overt and covert channels, Bugiel et al. extended
the ActivityManager of Android system which detects and
registers all installed services and content providers in the
system. XManDroid tags each row in the databases of system
content providers with the UIDs of writers. Upon writing data,
these tags are updated. Upon reading, XManDroid verifies for
each row if the corresponding readerewriter pairs constitutes
a policy violation. Similarly to system content providers,
Bugiel et al. tagged each value of the system services with the
UID of writers. Upon reading from the services, XManDroid
performs a policy evaluation if the reading will establish a
policy violating channel.
In two works of Bugiel et al. (2011b) and Bugiel et al. (2012),
Bugiel et al. extended theXManDroid frameworkwith a kernel-
level module by adapting and tweaking TOMOYO Linux. With
the additional kernel module, Bugiel et al. implemented a
mandatory access control on the file system (including UNIX
domain sockets) and local Internet sockets. To support the
run-time dynamic low-level policy enforcement, a callback
channel between the kernel and the middleware was also
provided.
In 2012, Fragkaki designed and implemented Sorbet, which
allows developers to define policies to mitigate undesired in-
formation flows and confused deputy attack. Sorbet tracks the
permissions of all components on a call stack. When a
component A is called, and A is protected by the permission P,
Sorbet evaluates if every component on the call stack has P
(Fragkaki et al., 2012).
Marforio et al. explored possible overt and covert chan-
nels on Android and measured the throughput of each
channel (Marforio et al., 2012). The analysis showed that
even covert channels with low throughput were still suffi-
cient to exchange possibly private information. Moreover,
Marforio et al. proposed four different techniques to remove
the taint from tainted variables. Marforio et al. also evalu-
ated the effectiveness of TaintDroid and XManDroid. In the
evaluation, TaintDroid was able to correctly report the
transmission of sensitive data through two out of four overt
channels. As was expected, the covert channels were unde-
tected by TaintDroid. On the other hand, XManDroid detected
all the overt channels except the system log channel. It also
successfully detected or blocked the type of intents, UNIX
socket discovery, reading/proc/stat and threads enumeration
covert channels. However, a small subset of covert channels
were not detected by XManDroid such as free space on fil-
esystem, processor frequency. The evaluation also showed that
XManDroid suffered from the limitation of false-positive re-
sults when two non-malicious applications tried to share
legitimate data. The communication in XManDroid was even
blocked even if non-sensitive data was shared.
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Comparison
The defense mechanism proposed by Schlegel et al. was
specific to Soundcomber. That is, this mechanism only worked
for colluding malwares which extracted information from
phone calls (Schlegel et al., 2011).
Table 3 summarizes the comparison among TaintDroid,
QUIRE, IPC Inspection, XManDroid, and Sorbet. As shown in
Table 3, TaintDroid, QUIRE, IPC Inspection, Sorbet, and XManDroid
all addressed the confused deputy attack through tracking
the information flow between applications, but none of them
fully addressed the collusion attack. Although XManDroid
extended the ActivityManager of Android system which
detects and registers all installed services and content pro-
viders in the system specially formitigating the collusion attack
over overt and covert channels, there were still one overt
channel and a small subset of covert channels not detected by
XManDroid according to Marforio et al.’s evaluation (Marforio
et al., 2012). While Sorbet shares many similarities with
QUIRE and IPC Inspection, Sorbet’s novelty is to allow developers
to specify policies on a per-application basis, which is not
showed in Table 3.
Facilitating permission administration
Overview
Three roles are usually involved in the Android permission
administration: developers declare which permissions the
application will request; applicationmarketers verify whether
the application is legitimate or not by an automatic tool or
manual review; users decide whether to approve the permis-
sion requests. These three roles are usually performed by
those who are not well-trained in policy based management
(Han et al., 2013). To facilitate the permission administration
of Android, researchers have proposed several methods and
tools to assist application developers (Vidas et al., 2011; Sarma
et al., 2012; Han et al., 2013), application marketers (Google,
2012), and application users (Sarma et al., 2012; Han et al.,
2013).
Countermeasures
In 2011, Vidas et al. built an Eclipse IDE plugin, Permission Check
Tool, which assists developers in specifying a minimum set of
permissions required for a given Android application (Vidas
et al., 2011). Permission Check Tool analyzes application source
code and automatically informs the developer on the mini-
mum set of permissions required to run the application
properly.
In 2012, Google announced that a service named Bouncer
had been deployed on Google Play Store (Google, 2012). Bouncer
scans Google Play automatically for potentially malicious ap-
plications without disrupting the user experience of Google
Play Store or requiring developers to go through an application
approval process.
Sarma et al. proposed to better inform policy administra-
tors whether the risks of installing an application was
commensurate with its expected benefit (Sarma et al., 2012).
Specially, Sarma et al. proposed to capture the benefit of an
application by using the category and sub-category of the
application, and capture the risk by using the usage percent-
age of the permissions among the applications in the same
category. When a user sees a warning triggered by an appli-
cation, he or she should bemore cautious about the risk of the
application being installed. When a developer sees a warning
triggered by his or her application, he or she should consider
how to make the application avoid triggering the signal.
In 2013, to simplify the tasks of permission administration
for both developers and users, Han et al. proposed the
Collaborative Policy Administration (CPA) framework (Han et al.,
2013). The essential idea of CPA is that applications with
similar functionalities shall have similar policies. The simi-
larity measuremethods are designed to judge the similarity of
different applications and retrieving similar policy sets from a
policy bas. These similarity measure methods may be
choosing applications belonging to the same category on
Google Play Store, or performing text mining on the applica-
tions’ description. Then end-users can verify or specify the
permission configuration of an Android application by
leveraging CPA.
Comparison
The ideas proposed by Sarma et al. (2012) and Han et al.’s
(2013) CPA are similar in that they both took the function-
ality of an application into consideration, along with the
permissions which the application requested, to better inform
policy administrators. In addition, they both proposed to
judge the functionality of an application by its category.
However, Han et al. also proposed to perform text mining on
the application’s description to find similar applications and
the evaluation showed that the latter approach had a better
performance than the first one which is based on category.
Future work
In this section, we identify promising directions to improve
the permission framework on Android. We point out that
Table 3 e Comparison among mitigating solutions to
permission escalation attack.
Effects Working
layerAddress
confused
deputy
attack
Address collusion
attack
Overt
channel
Covert
channel
TaintDroida U Partially 7 Middleware
QUIREb U 7 7 Middleware
& Kernelf
IPC Inspectionc U 7 7 Middleware
XManDroidd U Partially Partially Middleware
& Kernel
Sorbete U 7 7 Middleware
& Kernel
a Enck et al. (2010).
b Dietz et al. (2011).
c Felt et al. (2011a).
d Bugiel et al. (2011a, 2011b, 2012).
e Fragkaki et al. (2012).
f Countermeasures working in the kernel layer usually involve
modifications in the Linux kernel.
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there are many important issues to address in this field,
including designing more efficient detection methods for
permission escalation attack, identifying more vulnerabilities
on current permission framework, and enforcing mandatory
access control policies (Smalley and Craig, 2013; Bugiel et al.,
2013).
Data driven methods to strengthen Android framework
A meaningful direction is to collect and analyze a large vol-
ume of security-relevant data on Android usage such as de-
scriptions, implementations (APK files), usage log, reviews
and ratings of Android applications. Collecting and analyzing
such data can help researchers discover intrinsic trends and
patterns relevant to Android security, including the
ecosystem of malicious applications. Researchers can
leverage such data to propose novel methods for strength-
ening the Android framework. Currently, such data are used
to discover the characteristics of malicious codes, and detect
malicious or unsuitable applications according to permission
configurations (Han et al., 2013) and implementation settings
(Bugiel et al., 2011a). Also, such data can be used to evaluate
role mining algorithms, and boost up the development of role
based access control mechanisms (Zhang et al., 2013).
It would be challenging to collect a large volume of
permission related data on Android. Such data can be
collected from application markets (e.g., descriptions and
implementations) and social network services such as Twitter
and Facebook (e.g., reviews, usage log, characteristics of ap-
plications’ users, and relationships among these users). For
example, the characteristics of application users and re-
lationships among these users can be leveraged to enforce the
following principlemore accurately: Similar users may configure
similar permissions for similar applications. This can help un-
skillful permission administrators design and verify permis-
sion configurations of Android applications.
Consistency between application intentions and system
implementation
Many researchers have identified the problem of inconsis-
tency among descriptions, permission configurations, and
implemented functions. Leveraging this inconsistency, an
adversary can trap end-users into installing a malicious
application (Vennon, 2010) in a way similar to the phishing
attack on the Web. For example, a standalone game may
request for INTERNET permission; this could be useless in its
implementation, or it can be used as an advertisement func-
tionality without prompt; the standalone game may secretly
implement a paid functionality via accessing some tolled
websites. Researchers may propose effective tools which can
remove such redundant permissions, prompt advertisement
usage, and warn potential malicious usage.
We argue that it is also important to verify the consistency
among descriptions, permission configurations, and imple-
mented functions. It is also important to create permission
configuration or brief description of an application based on
its implementation. The biggest challenge to achieve this is to
understand the dynamic features in the implementation of an
Android application.
In addition, the development in policy management for
refining high level policies, such as goal policies or utility
policies, can help developers of Android applications main-
tain consistency between application intentions and system
implementation.
Flexible and fine-grained permission models
The current model of Android permissions is coarse-grained
and inflexible. It is difficult to specify the context of permis-
sions. For example, INTERNET permission is required by most
of applications (Barrera et al., 2010); however, it is not possible
to specify the permission in varied context of application
usage. As a result, an end-user is unlikely to care about the
prompt of permission requests, because he or she has
encountered too many such requests (Sarma et al., 2012).
Furthermore, traditional access control models are usually
linked to different objects, such as reading a file in the disk.
However, the current permission model on Android is speci-
fied with respect to all objects in the same category.
We argue that some context-aware models (Conti et al.,
2011; Chen et al., 2013) of Android permissions can help de-
velopers make more accurate permission requests for their
applications. The content of the context should cover some
usage environment variables and attributes of objects.
Furthermore, it would be meaningful to employ standard ac-
cess control policy languages (Han and Lei, 2012) such as
XACML to express Android permissions. Even though this
would lead to performance degradation, the benefit on
portability and flexibility due to the use of such languagesmay
overweight the performance loss.
Conclusion
The security issues and countermeasures of Android systems
have been rigorously studied since the first Android device
was shipped to the market. In recent years, the problem of
Android security has become even more severe, partially due
to the vulnerabilities in the design of Android systems, and
partially due to the huge success of Android devices in the
market. Motivated to provide a systematic overview of the
current research on Android security, we identify six issues in
Android security, including coarse granularity of permissions,
incompetent permission administrators, insufficient permis-
sion documentation, over-claim of permissions, permission
escalation attack, and TOCTOU attack. The former three are
indirect issues, while the latter three are direct issues, which
may lead to financial loss or privacy leakage directly.
In this paper, we investigated the countermeasures to
address the issues in Android security. In particular, we
showed the development of these countermeasures and
compared them systematically according to the technical
features of these countermeasures.
Although the situation of Android security is severe, we
identified plenty of opportunities to improve Android security,
especially when more security relevant data such as permis-
sion configurations and secure system implementations are
publicly available. Based on comprehensive analysis on the
issues and countermeasures, we argued that Android security
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can be improved by developing data-driven tools to
strengthen Android framework, and maintaining consistency
between application intentions and implementations.
Acknowledgment
This paper is supported by the projects of National Key
Science and Technology Program (2012ZX01039-004-20),
Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai (12ZR1402600), 12th
Five-Year National Development Foundation for Cryptog-
raphy (MMJJ201301008), Innovation Foundation of STCSM
(Grant No. 12511504200), and the open projects funded by
CNNIC DNSLab and Key Lab of Information Network Secu-
rity, Ministry of Public Security (C13612). We thank Miss
Xinyi Zhang for her English polish. We also thank anony-
mous reviewers for their comments. Weili Han is the cor-
responding author.
r e f e r e n c e s
Android. Gmail e android market https://web.archive.org/web/
20110328201807/https://market.android.com/details?id¼com.
google.android.gm; 2011.
Android http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/
permission-element.html; 2013a.
Android. Manifest.permission http://developer.android.com/
reference/android/Manifest.permission.html; 2013b.
Au KWY, Zhou YF, Huang Z, Lie D. Pscout: analyzing the android
permission specification. In: Proc. of ACM CCS. ACM; 2012.
pp. 217e28.
Barrera D, Kayacik HG, van Oorschot PC, Somayaji A. A
methodology for empirical analysis of permission-based
security models and its application to android. In: Proc. of
ACM CCS. ACM; 2010. pp. 73e84.
Beresford AR, Rice A, Skehin N, Sohan R. Mockdroid: trading
privacy for application functionality on smartphones. In: Proc.
of HotMobile. ACM; 2011. pp. 49e54.
Bugiel S, Davi L, Dmitrienko A, Fischer T, Sadeghi A. XManDroid: a
new Android evolution to mitigate privilege escalation
attacks. Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt; 2011a [Technical
Report; Technical Report TR-2011-04].
Bugiel S, Davi L, Dmitrienko A, Fischer T, Sadeghi A, Shastry B.
Towards taming privilege-escalation attacks on android. In:
Proc. of NDSS; 2012.
Bugiel S, Davi L, Dmitrienko A, Fischer T, Sadeghi AR, Shastry B.
Poster: the quest for security against privilege escalation
attacks on android. In: Proc. of ACM CCS. ACM; 2011b.
pp. 741e4.
Bugiel S, Heuser S, Sadeghi AR. Flexible and fine-grained
mandatory access control on android for diverse security and
privacy policies. In: Usenix security; 2013.
Chen KZ, Johnson NM, D’Silva V, Dai S, MacNamara K, Magrino T,
et al. Contextual policy enforcement in android applications
with permission event graphs. In: NDSS; 2013.
Conti M, Nguyen V, Crispo B. Crepe: context-related policy
enforcement for android. Inf Secur; 2011:331e45.
Davi L, Dmitrienko A, Sadeghi A, Winandy M. Privilege escalation
attacks on android. Inf Secur; 2011:346e60.
Dietz M, Shekhar S, Pisetsky Y, Shu A, Wallach D. Quire:
lightweight provenance for smart phone operating systems.
In: Proc. of USENIX security; 2011.
Enck W, Gilbert P, Chun BG, Cox LP, Jung J, McDaniel P, et al.
Taintdroid: an information-flow tracking system for realtime
privacy monitoring on smartphones. In: Proc. of USENIX OSDI;
2010. pp. 1e6.
Enck W, Octeau D, McDaniel P, Chaudhuri S. A study of android
application security. In: Proc. of USENIX security, 2011; 2011.
Enck W, Ongtang M, McDaniel P. Mitigating android software
misuse before it happens; 2008.
Enck W, Ongtang M, McDaniel P. On lightweight mobile phone
application certification. In: Proc. of ACM CCS. ACM; 2009.
pp. 235e45.
F-Secure. Mobile threat report JanuaryeMarch 2013 http://www.f-
secure.com/static/doc/labs_global/Research/Mobile_Threat_
Report_Q1_2013.pdf; 2013.
Felt A, Wang H, Moshchuk A, Hanna S, Chin E. Permission re-
delegation: attacks and defenses. In: Proc. of USENIX security;
2011. pp. 22e37.
Felt AP, Chin E, Hanna S, Song D, Wagner D. Android permissions
demystified. In: Proc. of ACM CCS. ACM; 2011b. pp. 627e38.
Felt AP, Greenwood K, Wagner D. The effectiveness of application
permissions. In: Proc. of USENIX WebApps. USENIX
Association; 2011c. p. 7.
Felt AP, Ha E, Egelman S, Haney A, Chin E, Wagner D. Android
permissions: user attention, comprehension, and behavior. In:
Proc. of SOUPS. ACM; 2012. p. 3.
Fragkaki E, Bauer L, Jia L, Swasey D. Modeling and enhancing
android’s permission system. In: Computer SecurityeESORICS
2012. Springer; 2012. pp. 1e18.
Google. Android and security http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/
2012/02/android-and-security.html; 2012.
Gozalvez J. First googles android phone launched. IEEE Veh
Technol Mag 2008;3(4):3e9.
Grace M, Zhou Y, Wang Z, Jiang X. Systematic detection of
capability leaks in stock android smartphones. In: Proc. of
NDSS; 2012.
Han W, Fang Z, Yang LT, Pan G, Wu Z. Collaborative policy
administration. IEEE TPDS 2013;24(1):1.
Han W, Lei C. A survey on policy languages in network and
security management. Comput Networks 2012;56(1):477e89.
Hornyack P, Han S, Jung J, Schechter S, Wetherall D. These aren’t
the droids you’re looking for: retrofitting android to protect
data from imperious applications. In: Proc. of ACM CCS. ACM;
2011. pp. 639e52.
IDC. Android and ios combine for 92.3operating system
shipments in the first quarter while windows phone leapfrogs
blackberry, according to idc http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?
containerId¼prUS24108913; 2013.
Jeon J, Micinski KK, Vaughan JA, Fogel A, Reddy N, Foster JS, et al.
Dr. android and mr. hide: fine-grained permissions in android
applications. In: Proc. of ACM SPSM. ACM; 2012. pp. 3e14.
Jia L, Aljuraidan J, Fragkaki E, Bauer L, Stroucken M, Fukushima K,
et al. Run-time enforcement of information-flow properties on
android e (extended abstract). In: ESORICS; 2013. pp. 775e92.
Kemmerer RA. A practical approach to identifying storage and
timing channels: twenty years later. In: Proc. of ACSAC. IEEE;
2002. pp. 109e18.
Leontiadis I, Efstratiou C, Picone M, Mascolo C. Don’t kill my ads!:
balancing privacy in an ad-supported mobile application
market. In: Proc. of HotMobile. ACM; 2012. p. 2.
Marforio C, Francillon A, Capkun S. Application collusion attack
on the permission-based security model and its implications
for modern smartphone systems. ETH Zurich; 2011 [Technical
Report; Technical Report 724].
Marforio C, Ritzdorf H, Francillon A, Capkun S. Analysis of the
communication between colluding applications on modern
smartphones. In: Proc. of ACSAC. ACM; 2012. pp. 51e60.
Mueller K, Butler K. Poster: Flex-p: flexible android permissions.
In: Proc. of IEEE S&P; 2011.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 4 3 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 2 0 5e2 1 8 217
Nauman M, Khan S, Zhang X. Apex: extending android
permission model and enforcement with user-defined
runtime constraints. In: Proc. of ACM ASIACCS. ACM; 2010.
pp. 328e32.
Ongtang M, McLaughlin S, Enck W, McDaniel P. Semantically rich
application-centric security in android. Secur Commun
Networks 2011;5(6):658e73.
Pearce P, Felt AP, Nunez G, Wagner D. Addroid: privilege
separation for applications and advertisers in android. In:
Proc. of ACM ASIACCS. ACM; 2012. pp. 71e2.
Saltzer JH. Protection and the control of information sharing in
multics. Commun ACM 1974;17(7):388e402.
Sarma BP, Li N, Gates C, Potharaju R, Nita-Rotaru C, Molloy I.
Android permissions: a perspective combining risks and
benefits. In: Proc. of ACM SACMAT. ACM; 2012. pp. 13e22.
Schlegel R, Zhang K, Zhou X, Intwala M, Kapadia A, Wang X.
Soundcomber: a stealthy and context-aware sound trojan for
smartphones. In: Proc. of NDSS; 2011. pp. 17e33.
Schmidt A, Schmidt H, Clausen J, Yuksel K, Kiraz O,
Camtepe A, et al. Enhancing security of linux-based
android devices. In: Proc. of 15th International Linux
Kongress. Lehmann; 2008.
Shekhar S, Dietz M, Wallach DS. Adsplit: separating smartphone
advertising from applications. CoRR 2012;28 [abs/12024030].
Shin W, Kwak S, Kiyomoto S, Fukushima K, Tanaka T. A small but
non-negligible flaw in the android permission scheme. In: IEEE
POLICY. IEEE; 2010. pp. 107e10.
Smalley S, Craig R. Security enhanced (se) android: Bringing
flexible mac to android. In: NDSS; 2013.
Vennon T. Android malware. a study of known and potential
malware threats; February 2010. p. 24 [Online].
Vidas T, Christin N, Cranor L. Curbing android permission creep.
In: Proc. of the Web, vol 2; 2011.
Wei X, Gomez L, Neamtiu I, Faloutsos M. Permission evolution in
the android ecosystem. In: Proc. of ACSAC. ACM; 2012.
pp. 31e40.
Welch C. Google: 900 million android activations to date, 48
billion app installs. The Verge; 2013.
Xu R, Saı¨di H, Anderson R. Aurasium: practical policy
enforcement for android applications. In: Proc. of USENIX
security. USENIX Association; 2012. p. 27.
Zhang X, Han W, Fang Z, Yin Y, Mustafa H. Role mining algorithm
evaluation and improvement in large volume android
applications. In: Proceedings of the first international
workshop on Security in embedded systems and
smartphones; 2013. pp. 19e26.
Zhou Y, Zhang X, Jiang X, Freeh VW. Taming information-stealing
smartphone applications (on android). In: Proc. of TRUST.
Springer; 2011. pp. 93e107.
Zheran Fang is a graduate student with Software School at Fudan
University now. He is currently a member of the Laboratory of
Cryptography and Information Security, Software School, Fudan
University. His research interests mainly include information
security, policy based management.
Weili Han is an associate professor with Software School, Fudan
University. His research interests are mainly in the fields of policy
based management, IoT security. He received his Ph.D. of Com-
puter Science and Technology at Zhejiang University in 2003.
Then, he joined the faculty of Software School at Fudan Univer-
sity. From 2008 to 2009, he visited Purdue University as a visiting
scholar funded by China Scholarship Council and Purdue Uni-
versity. Weili Han has served in several leading conferences and
journals as PC members and reviewers. Weili Han is a member of
ACM, IEEE and CCF.
Yingjiu Li is currently an Associate Professor in the School of In-
formation Systems at Singapore Management University. He
received his Ph.D. degree in Information Technology from George
Mason University in 2003. His research interests include RFID
security and privacy, applied cryptography and system security,
and data applications security. He has published over 100 tech-
nical papers in international conferences and journals. Yingjiu Li
is a senior member of the ACM and a member of the IEEE Com-
puter Society.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 4 3 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 2 0 5e2 1 8218
